The Sale of the Century: Privatization in Great Britain by Gregory, Tracy L.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Perspectives on business and economics Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1988




Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v06
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Perspectives on business and economics by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory, Tracy L., "The Sale of the Century: Privatization in Great Britain" (1988). Perspectives on business and economics. Paper 2.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v06/2
THE SALE OF THE CENTURY: 
PRIVATIZATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 
Tracy· Gregory 
Introduction 
What do a British airline, the biggest stock 
market offering in the world, a bank with liter-
ally no owner and Margaret Thatcher all have 
in common? They're all part of Great Britain's 
Conservative Party's plans to create one of the 
most sweeping redistributions of property, 
short of a revolution, ever seen. Since 1979, the 
British government has raised over 12 bil-
lion (approximately $21 billion) by selling 
shares of formerly public assets such as British 
Telecommunications, Trustee Savings Bank, 
British Gas, and British Airways. 
The purpose of this article is to provide 
the reader with an overview of the privatization 
campaign as a whole and to take an in-depth 
look at the sale of the four representative com-
panies mentioned above. I will examine each 
company before the sale and analyze the effects 
of the sale on the company. I will also appraise 
how each of these sales has impacted both the 
British economy and the Conservative Party's 
political standing. 
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The government has expressed several 
motives for privatization, including increased 
competition, tax cuts, and wider share owner-
ship. So far, none of these stated goals have 
been accomplished. Privatization has only suc-
ceeded in yielding tremendous price gains for 
shareholders lucky enough to participate. For 
example, the price of British Telecom shares 
more than doubled on the first day of trading. 
Mter one year, the price had quadrupled. 
These price gains have helped the Conser-
vative Party accomplish its unstated goal of 
privatization- to get Margaret Thatcher re-
elected. She took office in 1979 and was reelec-
ted in 1983 and again in 1988 partly because 
privatization has been such a political success. 
Privatization has also served her purpose of 
weakening the Labour Party by promoting the 
ideal of England as a capitalist democracy. 
The Labour Party had threatened to rena-
tionalize everything when it returned to power, 
but Margaret Thatcher has taken steps to make 
sure this never happens. First, most of the 
shares were sold to British voters. Since they -
have been making money in the stock market, 
it is doubtful that they would support the pros-
pect of renationalization. Second, even if the 
Labour Party does eventually return to power, 
Margaret Thatcher has tried to spread out share 
ownership in privatized companies to such an 
extent that renationalization would be a very 
difficult and expensive task. 
It is too soon to tell how long the effects of 
privatization will last or how they will affect 
the next general election in 1993. Due to her 
age, it is unlikely that Margaret Thatcher will 
run again, but the Conservative Party may stay 
in power if privatization is still successful five 
years from now. If the stock prices of those 
companies already privatized begin a down-
ward trend, however, or if the issues of com-
panies yet to be privatized fail to generate good 
returns, confidence in the Conservative Party 
may drop and the Labour Party's chances will 
improve in 1993. 
The Process of Privatization 
In the process of privatizing, the British 
government has not relinquished total control 
of the firms. In some cases, only part of a com-
pany has been sold, and in most cases the 
government has retained a perpetual "golden 
share." This golden share provides no voting 
rights, but it still gives the government the 
right to veto the creation of a new class of stock 
and the sale or disposal of more than 25% of net 
assets or net income. The power that the gov-
ernment retains in these companies makes 
them less attractive to speculators, but en-
courages small investors who trust the gov-
ernment's decision-making ability. 
The two most common methods for priva-
tizing a state-owned company are the offer-for-
sale by tender and the untendered offer-for-
sale. If an issue is tendered, each potential 
investor is asked to state a price at which he 
would be ready to buy a specified number of 
shares. By averaging individual's tender prices, 
one price is determined, and all shares are 
initially sold at this price. This method usually 
results in a closer approximation of the "real" 
market price for an issue because the price is 
determined by the buyers themselves. 
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The most common method for transfer is 
the untendered offer-for-sale. It is important to 
recognize the difference between the under-
writing systems in Britain and the U.S. In the 
U.S., investment banks underwrite the issue 
and then sell directly to final purchasers. In 
Britain, the primary underwriters are a small 
group of merchant banks. The sub-underwriters 
are the large institutions which guarantee to 
take up the unsold shares on a retail basis. It is 
the group of merchant bankers who determine 
the price of an issue in advance. To be sure that 
all shares will sell quickly, these bankers en-
courage investors with market discounts, the 
size of which depends on the condition of the 
stock market and the size of the issue. Larger 
issues require larger discounts to prevent 
flooding the market. 
One way of judging the success of priva-
tization, and how it has affected the Conserva-
tive Party's political popularity, is to examine 
the stock market performance of several com-
panies. The performance of each company, 
however, cannot be judged in isolation. It is 
important to recognize the differences be-
tween the companies, the characteristics of the 
industries in which they operate, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the sales. 
British Telecommunications 
The first example of privatization which I 
will discuss is that of British Telecommunica-
tions. British Telecom (BT) provides telephone 
service for U.K. customers. It also operates na-
tional paging and radio telephone networks, 
owns a majority of one of the two cellular 
mobile telephone networks in the U.K., manu-
factures and markets telephones, and publishes 
the Yellow Pages. British Telecommunications 
and the Post Office had been run as a single 
unit until 1981, when the two were separated. 
BT is currently the world's fourth largest 
telecommunications utility, servicing 20 mil-
lion customers, operating 7000 exchanges and 
employing 241,000 people (Gribben, p. 20). Its 
emphasis is on the business customer, and 
one-third of its revenues are received from its 
three hundred largest corporate clients. 
Although British Telecom is a near-
monopoly, it is not without its problems. Ap-
proximately 60% of its customers rely on 
electromechanical equipment designed more 
than eighty years ago; and in some areas, it can 
take months to get a phone installed (Gribben, 
p. 20). Some ofBT's problems stem from its for-
mer government ownership. Its cumbersome 
bureaucracy often made it difficult to make 
sound decisions, and it found itself unable to 
move aggressively into foreign markets while 
labelled as a public utility. Still, with today's 
technology, there was no reason for BT's fail-
ure to meet changing demand. However, since 
it was a public utility and a near-monopoly, 
there was no incentive to change. 
The failure of British Telecom to provide 
the British public with modem telecommuni-
cation services paved the way for a bold, state-
of-the-art competitor to enter the market. The 
government helped speed up the process with 
the British Telecommunications Act of 1981. 
The Act enabled private firms to provide serv-
ices using BT's network and allowed private 
firms to supply equipment to BT's network. 
More importantly, it licensed the Mercury Con-
sortium to establish and operate an independ-
ent network for the business community, all in 
direct competition with British Telecom. Mer-
cury had a beginning budget of £50 million 
and no debt, was the first in Europe with an all-
digital network, and has been providing new 
standards of service not found anywhere else. 
Service began in 1983 in the City of London 
and has been spreading ever since through the 
use of optic fibers running in ducts along the 
tracks of British Rail. 
British Telecom reacted to Mercury's 
threat by taking competitive steps for the first 
time ever. It lowered some prices by as much as 
35%, offered such new services as high speed 
electronic mail and data communications, and 
has retrained its managers to think in profit-
oriented terms. In fact, British Telecom has 
recently been combating its competition more 
aggressively than the government ever thought 
possible. Since one of the reasons for privatiza-
tion is to bring about increased competition in 
the marketplace, it is important politically for 
Mercury to succeed. In fact, from the start Mer-
cury's prospects were so good that shortly after 
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it began operations, the British government 
announced the forthcoming sale of British 
Telecom. The government preferred to sell BT 
intact instead of breaking it up, apparently 
deciding that the presence of Mercury satisfied 
the requirements for competition. 
As with most other issues, the govern-
ment prepared for the sale with heavy advertis-
ing. British Telecom spent £50 million in 
advertising aimed at the small investor. It even 
sent advice on how to buy stock to its cus-
tomers along with their phone bills. Then, cus-
tomers were offered special incentives to buy 
BT stock. With a minimum investment of 
£ 250 (approximately $440), customers could 
opt to receive discounts on their telephone 
bills for three years, or they could participate in 
the 10% bonus share scheme offered to all 
potential investors. Most of these incentives, 
however, were tailored to individual share-
holders in order to accomplish the goal of wider 
share ownership. 
In December, 1984, 50.2% of British Tele-
communications was offered for sale, a sale 
which raised £4 billion (approximately $7 
billion) for the British government. At the time, 
BT was the biggest stock market offering in the 
world, accounting for 50% of all new issues on 
the London Stock Exchange in 1984. Upon pri-
vatization, BT would instantly become 
England's biggest public company. This was 
also the first time foreign investors would have 
the opportunity to buy shares in a privatized 
company, and complications surrounding mul-
tiple-launches into the London, New York, 
Toronto, and Tokyo stock exchanges added to 
the uncertainty surrounding the sale. 
The British government sold the BT 
shares for SOp each; and on the first day of trad-
ing, the price nearly doubled. In fact, over the 
next month the price rose to 105p, 210% above 
the initial sale price. On the first day of trading 
alone, investors in British Telecom realized an 
immediate gain of £1.7 billion, while inves-
tors in the U.S. made $80 million (Kaletsky, p. 
55). Mter one year, the share price had in-
creased by 296%- the largest percentage share 
price increase of any of the privatized com-
panies. 
The reason for such impressive price gains 
was simply excess demand. British investors 
could not get their hands on enough British 
Telecom stock, and applications exceeded shares 
offered by a factor of five. When BT suddenly 
accounted for over 6% of the London stock 
market index, institutions found themselves 
needing still more BT stock in order to match 
their portfolio performance with that of the 
Financial Times All-Share Index, a common 
measure of the London stock market. 
Since the market put the value of BT 
shares at a level which was twice as high as that 
set by the government, it seems likely that the 
government was not trying to maximize its 
revenue from this sale. If raising revenue were a 
primary goal of privatization, the government 
would have been wise to sell just a few shares at 
first, wait to see how the market valued BT, and 
then sell a little more at a time over a few years. 
The government lost its chance to raise twice 
as much revenue as it did from the sale of 
British Telecom. 
Margaret Thatcher was correct in her rea-
soning that stockholders would make subs tan-
tial gains on BT stock. But, in order to make 
sure that privatization would help her stay in 
office, the voters would have to be the ones 
enjoying most of the gains, not British institu-
tions or foreign investors. As it turned out, the 
BT sale resulted in the widest share ownership 
of all the privatized concerns. Before British 
Telecom, individual share ownership in Great 
Britain had dropped to less than 2 million. Mter 
the sale, that number doubled. Forty-six per-
cent of all shareholders were holding BT stock, 
and 26% were holding only BT (Guirdham and 
Tan, p. 31). Many of these shareholders were 
British Telecom employees, 96% of whom 
bought shares (Young, p. 3). 
By the end of the first year after the sale, 
however, BT lost 26% of its shareholders 
(Sampson, p. 30). Many of these shareholders 
simply sold their shares when the price began 
to soar to realize substantial profits. Others no 
doubt feared renationalization in the event 
that the Labour Party should regain power. 
British Telecom's performance literally 
"sold" the British public on the idea of priva-
tization, and subsequent privatizations have 
reinforced the notion that there were gains to 
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be made by owning stock. British Telecom was 
the first privatization to have a measurable 
effect on the popularity of the Conservative 
Party. 
Trustee Savings Bank 
Certainly the most unique enterprise ever 
sold on the privatization agenda was Trustee 
Savings Bank (TSB). TSB is a commercial bank 
with assets of£ 2 billion, 1624 branches, and 
more retail customers than any other bank in 
England (Kaletsky, p. 56). What makes Trustee 
Savings Bank special lies in its history. In 1975, 
over one hundred savings banks merged to 
form TSB. The consolidations left TSB with a 
bizarre legal and financial structure, and lit-
erally no owner. Up to the time of privatization, 
the government had been appointing its man-
agement; but strictly speaking the bank be-
longed neither to the government nor to its 
depositors. 
In 1986, the government apparently de-
sired to rid itself of the burden and sell the bank 
to the public. Since lawyers could not deter-
mine who should get the proceeds from the 
sale, it was decided that the bank itself would 
receive the proceeds. This meant that those 
who subscribed to buy shares ofTSB would, in 
effect, get back all the money they put up to 
buy TSB. And so Trustee Savings Bank started 
with £ 800 million in assets, kept the sale pro-
ceeds of £ 1.2 billion, and then wound up with 
assets of £ 2 billion. Thus stockholders paid 
£ 1.2 billion for assets worth £ 2 billion, 
which resulted in an outright "gift" of £ 800 
million (Sampson, p. 29). 
This situation posed a unique problem for 
determining the appropriate valuation forTSB. 
In theory, TSB could have become a "black 
hole" for capital, with no price high enough to 
equate supply and demand. Investors who 
bought shares in TSB would be getting back all 
the money which they had invested, with a pre-
mium added. Demand for the essentially cost-
less premium could theoretically have been 
infinite, and some believed that no amount of 
shares would be sufficient to satisfy demand. 
The government, however, was not overly con-
cerned about the matter of price since it was 
anxious to launch TSB into the private sector 
as soon as possible. Thus, an arbitrary price of 
1 OOp per share was selected. 
About 5 million applications were re-
ceived for the shares offered, and the number of 
shares which individuals could buy was lim-
ited. As it turned out, however, Trustee Savings 
Bank was not the "black hole" which some 
feared. In fact, surprisingly the price actually 
decreased during early trading. After one year, 
however, TSB stock was doing very well with 
its price rising to 154p per share, an increase of 
54% above the issue price. The initial price 
decline was also to have no ill effect on future 
privatizations. The British Gas offering fol-
lowed just two months later and was extreme-
ly successful. 
The TSB offering was one more bit of 
evidence that the British government was not 
primarily concerned with raising revenue in its 
privatization efforts. In fact, the government 
received no revenue whatsoever from the 
TSB sale. 
British Gas 
The third example of privatization which I 
will discuss is British Gas. British Gas is the 
largest integrated gas supply company in the 
Western world. Its activities include natural 
gas exploration and production, transmission 
through pipelines, gas storage, industrial and 
residential supply, and the sale and installation 
of gas appliances. The range of British Gas's 
activities is so extensive because it is the only 
public gas company in the world with a total 
monopoly on gas transmission and related serv-
ices. British Gas provides 99% of the natural gas 
used in Great Britain, so there can be no argu-
ment that the structure of the natural gas in-
dustry is anything but monopolistic. In the 
long run, however, other sources of fuel (such 
as coal and oil) provide competition for nat-
ural gas. 
In order to increase competition in the gas 
market, some had suggested breaking up 
British Gas into smaller companies before its 
sale. The model for this suggestion was the 
break-up of AT&T in the United States. The 
principal reason the British government did 
not break up British Gas, however, was that it 
was much easier to sell intact. (A large monop-
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oly is an attractive investment.) Marketability 
was thus considered to be more important than 
competition in this case. 
Despite British Gas's attractiveness to po-
tential shareholders, the size of the issue was 
still large enough to cause some concern. The 
£ 7.75 billion (approximately $13.7 billion) 
offering in November 1986 was the largest 
common stock offering in the world until the 
1987 offering of British Petroleum. Since no 
one had ever tried to sell that much all at once 
on any stock market, both the government and 
British Gas decided to boost the demand for the 
offering, and that called for advertising and 
buying incentives. 
Advertising began in 1986 with a £17 
million two-part "blitz" conducted by a British 
subsidiary of Madison Avenue's Young & 
Rubicam (Wilson and Wentz, p. 69). The first 
round of television and print ads was designed 
to merely tell people how profitable British Gas 
was. The second round of ads focused on the 
stock issue itself and featured the slogan, 
"Everyone can buy a share of the shares." 
Young & Rubicam then proceeded to spend an 
additional £40 million to develop a fictitious 
character, Sid, who quickly became a British 
folk hero. Sid is just an "average guy"; he's a 
stranger on the street, the man in the elevator 
at work, or the man sitting at the next table in 
your favorite restaurant. In the series of ads, the 
news of the British Gas offering was delivered 
by many unusual means, including even a car-
rier pigeon. But each ad ended with the line, "If 
you see Sid, tell him." The message was clear-
everyone should own shares in British Gas. 
To encourage investors further, still other 
incentives were offered. For example, British 
customers were guaranteed a minimum of two 
hundred shares when they applied. They could 
then choose to receive either a discount on 
their gas bill worth £10 for every 100 shares 
held, or a bonus of one additional share for 
every ten held for three years. By participating 
in these schemes, British households were 
guaranteed yields between 20% and 30% over 
the next three years. 
Mter the British public had been satu-
rated with advertising about British Gas, 96% 
of the company was offered for sale in Novem-
ber, 1986. Since demand for shares was expect-
ed to be high, specific rules about how the 
shares were to be divided among categories of 
investors were devised. The British govern-
ment was to hold one share of special stock and 
four percent of the ordinary shares. Of the more 
than 4 billion shares sold, 32 million, or 0.8%, 
were sold directly to employees of British Gas. 
Approximately 88% of the shares were sold in 
the U.K. and 4.2% were sold in the U.S. in the 
form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs). 
Under this latter arrangement, an American 
bank issues a piece of paper that gives the 
holder rights to the actual shares held by the 
bank at an overseas office. ADRs are convenient 
because they enable Americans to by shares 
without going abroad and are denominated in 
dollars. Moreover, dividends are automatically 
sent to the holder. U.S. institutions purchased 
as many shares as they could and have been 
holding them in their portfolios and getting 
nearly twice the dividend rate they can get from 
U.S. gas companies. The remaining shares were 
sold in Europe, Canada, and Japan. 
Once the British Gas shares were listed on 
the stock exchanges, trading for them reached 
a record level. Twenty percent were traded on 
the first day, raising the price from SOp to 64p, 
an increase of28%. This translates into a £560 
million "gift" from the British government 
which could have charged 64p to begin with. 
These price increases were the result of trading 
done by institutions only, since individual 
shareholders did not receive their letters of 
allotment until one week later. Institutional 
demand was stimulated because British Gas 
suddenly accounted for 2% of the Financial 
Times All-Share Index. Institutions which 
weighted their portfolios like the market were 
thus grossly "underweight" in their British Gas 
holdings, and sought to buy more shares in the 
market. Also, overseas investors didn't get as 
many shares as they wan ted and they further 
stimulated demand. After one year, the price of 
British Gas rose to 128p per share, an increase 
of 156%. 
British Airways 
The final privatization which I will be 
analyzing is that of British Airways. In 1971, 
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British Overseas Airways and British European 
Airways merged to form British Airways (BA). 
Even before privatization, BA had earned a 
reputation as the nation's flag carrier to the 
rest of the world. The British are proud of 
British Airways with good reason- BA "flies 
more passengers to more countries than any 
other airline" (Van de Vliet, p. 115). It serves all 
markets in the world (except South America 
and West Africa) and does so mainly from its 
hub at Heathrow, the world's busiest inter-
national airport. British Airways caters to busi-
ness travel, leisure and holiday travel, tour 
groups, charter business, world-wide cargo, 
and even flies the Concorde. -
In fact, British Airways' business is such 
that it now offers 82% of all British inter-
national flights, while its biggest competitor, 
British Caledonian, only provides 11%. This 
qualifies British Airways as a monopoly under 
the Fair Trading Act of 1973. Yet, the govern-
ment had never considered breaking up British 
Airways before its sale. This decision was not 
arrived at without controversy, however, the 
details of which will be discussed later in 
this section. 
Despite its near-monopoly situation, 
British Airways was not without problems. In 
1983, BA's debt was £1.053 billion; and al-
though by 1984 the debt was reduced to £901 
million, this still left BA with a debt-to-equity 
ratio of7.15 to !-excessively high, regardless 
of industry (Van de Vliet, p. 49). British Airways 
therefore needed lots of "fiscal engineering" 
before the sale was attempted. 
British Airways also suffered from the 
same problem of decision-making inflexibility 
that had earlier plagued British Telecom. To its 
credit, however, the British government gave 
British Airways the right to make its own de-
cisions before the sale by hiring Colin Marshall 
as Chief Executive Officer. Marshall had pre-
viously worked for Sears, Hertz and Avis, and 
he was given the job of reorganizing British 
Airways and getting it ready to enter the private 
sector. 
Marshall began by hiring Price Water-
house to analyze BA's problems and suggest 
solutions. British Airways then turned its at-
tention to cutting costs. Following the 1971 
merger that had formed BA, the en tire labor 
force had been retained, and many positions 
were unnecessary. From 1981 to 1984, how-
ever, 22,000 jobs were cut (Lace, p. 18). This 
reduced the wage bill costs by at least £ 200 
million, an amount which was subsequently 
used to help reduce BA's enormous debt. For 
those employees who stayed, rewards improved 
substantially. To be sure that its staff was well-
motivated, British Airways developed a profit-
sharing scheme. Each worker now receives an 
extra week's pay for every £50 million BA 
earns above the £150 million operating profit 
target (Lindsay, p. 21). The sale of British Air-
ways has also proved beneficial to labor pro-
ductivity. Since employees now own shares in 
their company, they are willing to offer a much 
higher level of customer service, which in tum 
increases profits. 
In 1983, British Airways took additional 
steps to reduce costs. It cut 62 routes, closed 22 
overseas offices, sold 71 unused aircraft, and 
withdrew 91 outdated planes from service 
(Lace, p. 18). It also conducted a market re-
search survey to find out exactly what cus-
tomers wanted and has since been trying to 
provide those services. In fact, it has even in-
stituted a training class entitled "Putting Peo-
ple First"- a course that all employees are now 
required to pass. 
Mter the arrival of Colin Marshall, British 
Airways experienced an incredibly fast tum-
around. A £544 million loss in the fiscal year 
1981/ 82 soon gave way to a £272 million 
profit in 1983/ 84 (Lace, p. 18). British Airways 
was finally in good shape to enter the private 
sector. 
As with most large privatizations, adver-
tising was crucial to the success of the issue. 
Previous privatizations had already created a 
great deal of momentum, so the BA campaign 
didn't have to drum up much initial enthusi-
asm for share ownership. Still, a total of £7 
million was spent through Saatchi & Saatchi 
on a series of ads, which featured symbols of 
national pride such as Big Ben, the Tower 
Bridge, and Albert Hall actually saluting 
British Airways (Bowen, p. 30). Other ads used 
film clips from "Casablanca" and "Close En-
counters of the Third Kind" to explain that BA 
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is the "World's favourite airline." 
With the British Airways sale, as with all 
others, it was important to decide to whom the 
shares were to be sold. The privatization of an 
airline was different from all previous privati-
zations because airlines are a high risk/ reward 
business. The government knew the risks, and 
so advertising was targeted away from the first-
time investors and geared more towards so-
phisticated investors familiar with how the 
market works. The warning was clear: British 
Airways was not a stock for "widows and or-
phans." The government in this case made no 
deliberate attempt to widen share ownership 
within Britain. 
The risk associated with investing in the 
airline industry arises because of the fact that 
the industry's success is heavily dependent 
upon world events. For example, during the 
running of the "Go for it America" and "Con-
corde Challenge" promotions, the U.S. bombed 
Libya and the accident at Chemobyl occurred. 
People became frightened of air travel, busi-
ness turned sour, and it was not a good time to 
sell airline stocks. Otherworld events such as a 
sudden rise in the price of oil can also have a 
drastic impact on airlines' profits and share 
prices. Proper timing of an issue is thus crucial; 
and in fact the sale of British Airways was 
officially delayed twice over a period of sev-
eral years. 
The first delay resulted from legal action 
taken by Laker Airways against British Airways, 
Trans-World Airways, Pan American World Air-
ways and a group of European airlines. Judge 
Harold Green (of AT&T fame) heard the $1.2 
billion antitrust suit which accused the other 
airlines of conspiring to put Laker out of busi-
ness. It was decided that the stock would be 
unmarketable given the uncertainty of the out-
come of this suit, and the float was delayed. BA 
came out of the Laker ordeal unscathed, how-
ever, and it appeared that BA would soon be 
ready for sale. 
The second delay came about in 1984 
when the British Civil Aviation Authority (CM) 
investigated the monopolistic status of BA and 
recommended that many of BA's short and long 
routes be shifted to other airlines, especially to 
British Caledonian Airways. The size of British 
Airways is six times that of British Caledonian, 
and the two carriers compete on half of British 
Airways' routes. British Caledonian lobbied 
fiercely for the government to approve the 
CM's proposal. This was Caledonian's chance 
to gain as many as 25 new routes before the 
"monopoly" was put into the private sector. On 
the other hand, British Airways argued that 
simply taking routes from one carrier and giv-
ing them to another was not synonomous with 
competition. Moreover, it claimed that these 
proposals would decrease British Airways' rev-
enues by 7 to 12% and consequently have a 
catastrophic effect on privatization (Robinson, 
p. 26). The Transport Secretary sided with BA 
and in his decision left the company and its 
routes intact. Disappointed by the decision, Sir 
Adam Thompson, co-founder of British Cale-
donian, said: 
The government had the opportunity 
to create two major international air-
lines rather than one major one and 
one minor. What was best for the 
industry was sacrificed in the interest 
of British Airways (Caulkin, p. 47). 
But the government's motives behind the deci-
sion were clear: a near-monopoly is easier to 
sell than a firm in a competitive industry. 
Most of the ordinary shares in British Air-
ways were sold in February, 1987. However, the 
government set aside 20 million shares (of the 
total 720 million shares) to be given as bonus 
payments for all shares purchased and held for 
three years. 
Of those shares that were sold to the 
public, 8% were bought in the United States in 
the form of ADRs. Americans received such a 
relatively large portion of the shares for two 
reasons. First, 30-35% of British Airways' busi-
ness is with the U.S. Also, as CEO Colin 
Marshall put it: 
The U.S. is really the only market in 
the world with a good understanding 
of airline stocks. On a comparison 
basis with, say, Pan Am, we feel we 
can offer a greater degree of stability 
(Robinson, p. 26). 
Because the sale date was postponed 
several times, British Airways' officers worried 
that the sale might follow too closely that of 
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another popular issue- British Telecom. More 
specifically, they were concerned that a situa-
tion would develop that would find potential 
investors having "used up" so much of their 
funds that they would not have the necessary 
£ 900 million left to buy shares in British Air-
ways. When British Airways was finally sold, 
however, it did in fact follow the BT sale and 
came only three months after the even bigger 
British Gas sale. In hindsight, the officers of 
British Airways need not have worried about 
the timing of the sale in relation to that of other 
issues. The history of privatization has since 
shown that the amount of funds people are 
willing to invest is not "fixed." On the first day 
of trading, in fact, the price per share of British 
Airways jumped from 65p to 109p, an increase 
of 67.7%. Investors obviously thought BA's 
price made it a "bargain." 
From a political angle, it is unlikely that 
British Airways had as much of an impact on 
the 1988 election as had British Telecom or 
British Gas. The size of the BA issue was rela-
. tively small. Also, many of the shareholders 
were foreign and so did not vote in the 
British elections. 
Conclusion 
There are many justifications offered for 
privatization. One of the major reasons is that 
it is supposed to increase competition and 
thereby raise efficiency. Greater efficiency may 
have resulted in a few cases, but in others 
privatization has simply continued the prob-
lem of market structure that already existed. 
British Gas, British Telecom, and British Air-
ways are all examples of monopolies (or near-
monopolies) that were simply transferred in-
tact to the private sector. No effective steps 
were taken to reduce the monopoly element 
present in these markets. 
Prime Minister Thatcher has also claimed 
that the selling of national assets would in-
crease government revenue, thereby allowing 
taxes to be reduced. But if this were truly the 
goal of privatization, then the government 
should have tried to maximize the revenues it 
received from the sales. As it turned out, the 
government realized no revenue from the sale 
ofTSB, and could have realized much more on 
the other issues, which were substantially 
undervalued at the time of the sale. 
Another stated goal of privatization is to 
increase share ownership, and this has been 
accomplished in the short-run, at least. In all 
cases of privatization, employees were offered 
shares at reduced prices, and a high proportion 
of them accepted. Wider share ownership has 
clearly served the Conservative Party's political 
interests. However, there is one major draw-
back to the privatization scheme which may 
eventually hurt the Party. Share ownership is 
"risky business." The government has per-
suaded its citizens to buy shares, but many of 
them have never owned stock before. Many do 
not fully understand how the market works, 
nor how it can "crash" as did the world stock 
market in the Fall of 1987. It is true, though, 
that most of the stocks which the government 
had been selling are not highly volatile. Also, 
the government did attempt to discourage un-
sophisticated investors from buying British 
Airways, but the warnings may have been inef-
fective. So much momentum and encourage-
ment had been built for previous issues that 
investing in formerly government-owned com-
panies may have become habitual. 
In the minds of many, the major goals of 
privatization have been downplayed. Simply 
put, the government rid itself of the burden-
some task of running companies that it felt 
more properly belonged in the private sector. In 
every case, the profits of the privatized com-
panies are higher than they were as public 
companies, although many are still not yet up 
to industry norms. 
Whatever the reasons for the "Sale of the 
Century," however, the fact remains that it was 
a successful political move. It has kept the 
Conservative Party in power and may continue 
to do so for years to come. It appears to be the 
case that as long as the British government has 
assets to sell, investors will buy shares in them. 
Therefore, the Labour Party may have to 
change its attitude towards renationalization if 
it ever hopes to regain substantial political 
support. 
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